Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

10-24-1958

People ex rel. Averna v. Palm Springs [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People ex rel. Averna v. Palm Springs [DISSENT]" (1958). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 25.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/25

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

38
A. No. 24796. In Bank. Od.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. JOHN A VBHNA et a1., Appellant, v.
CITY OF PALM SPHINGS, Respondent.
[1] Municipal Corporations-Annexation-Validity.- Quo warranto lies to attack a completed annexation proceeding.
[2] Quo Warranto-Pleading.-A complaint in quo warranto is
sufficient if it charges the usurpation of a franchise in general terms.
[3a, 3b] Id.- Burden of Proof: Pleading- Demurrer.
If the
pleader in quo warranto sets out the specific facts relied on
to show a usurpation, he assumes the burden of allegation
and proof, and the complaint is subject to general demurrer
if those facts do not state a cause of action. If plaintiff docs
not contend that any additional grounds arc available, it is
not error to deny leave to amend.
[ 4] !d.-Pleading.-A request that existing rules he revised to
require specific allegations in all cases where a quo warranto
action is brought on relation of private parties should he addressed to the Legislature, not the Supreme Court.
[5] Municipal Corporations-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory
-Pleading.-In a proceeding in quo warranto to test the
validity of annexation of uninhabited territory to a city,
plaintiff's allegation that failure to serve a certain corporate
landowner in the territory with written notice of its opportunity to protest the annexation deprived the city council of
jurisdiction to annex the territory was fatally deficient, where
plaintiff did not allege that the city failed to mail written
notice to all other landowners in the annexed territory, that
the requirements of Gov. Code, § 35311, for publication of notice were not observed, that the landowner did not acquire
knowledge of the contents of the published notice, that the
landowner did not appear at the hearing, that it desired to
protest, or that its protest, if any, was not in fact considE~rcd.
[6] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Notice and Hearing.-Where the notice of hearing for annexation of nnin[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 82 ct seq.; Am.
Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 23.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Quo Warranto, § 22; Am.Jur., (~uo Warranto,§ 89.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 43; [2, 4]
Quo Warranto, § 17; [3] Quo Warranto, §§ 18, 23; [5-7, 9-12, 14,
15, 17] Municipal Corporations, § 56.5; [8] Real Property; [13]
Municipal Corporations, § 24; [16] Taxation, §§ 25, 94.
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to a city
that the council would
determine "all written protests filed with the City
Connci!
to thP hour" set for hearing, no complaint could
lw made of the adequacy of the notice if the city wns justified
to entertain protests not submitted in the form
at the time
!d.--Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Protests.-··Gov.
CcHlc ~ :JiJ::ll2, deelnriug that at any time "before" the hour set
.
to annexation of uninhabited territory
t 0 n eit;v ;wy ownPr of property within the territory may file
'·writteu" jJrote;;t, means tlwt only written protRsts J1led before
tl 1e hour set for hearing need be considered; the word "may"
only to the extent that no one is required to file
!8] Real Property-Defini.tions.-"Land'' Hw:ms "the solid material
of the earth" ( Civ. Code,§ 659), and its value does not include
the vahw of improvements thereon.
[9] Municipal Corporations-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory
-Protests.---The HJo;) amendment of Gov. Code, § 35313, reto protests against annexation of uninhabited territory
to a city, so as to state ~pecifieally that "value of the territory"
means value of the land and improvements thereon, was merely
deelnratory of existing law, and the city council did not err in
nu1king its detennination, prior to the effective date of such
amendment, on the basis of value of both land and improvements.
[10] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Reasonableness.
-l,n annexation of uninhabited territory to a city which
violates no express statutory limitation restricting shape, extPnt or character of the annexed territory is not void for
unreasonableness merely because it is alleged that the topography of the annexed land makes it impo~sible of urban development, that its size is out of all proportion to the city's needs,
that p:ut of the territory is included in a national forest, and
thnt the land will not lwnefit by inclusion within the city, the
permissible shape, character or extent of the territory amwx:ed
being a political question.
[11] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Validity.-An
annexation of uninhabited territory to a city was not void as
fraudulent nhuse of the authority conferred by statute where
there was no nllegation of violation or evasion of any statutory provision !'Plating to the dctPnninat.ion ot' thP land to be
;lll!li'XPd. An nssNtion tllat. tlte ('it,v eouueil a;;signed a false
n•nson l"o1' illl!lexing tl11! l<'rritory :llld an iudeJlnitf' allegation

See Cal.Jur.2d, Real Property, § 2.
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taxPs
that the real reason was io
were
[12] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Validity.-The
motives of: a city council in seeking annexation of uninhabited
territory to the city cannot be inquired into so
as it proeeeded aceord ing io estn h lislwd law.
[13] Id.-Organization-Boundaries.--::.io one has a vested right
to be eiHH'r indndcd or excluded from a local governmental
nnd ttHl
of territorial boundaries of n municipal
~will not ordinarily constitute an invasion of fedPral constitutional
[14] !d.-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Validity.-The
rule that
taxing districts can confer but one readily
ascertainable benefit pceuliarly advantngeous to property
within the district and that, if such benefit does not accrue to
particular land, an assessment of that land to finance the improvements amounts to a taking of property without due
process of law. does not apply with respect to municipal
corporations whose advantages are general and varied, ineluding· the legally pt·esumcd intangible benefits resulting from
tho privilege of being part of an organized community, and
hence an annexation to a city of uninhabited t0nitory which
assertcdly benefits neither the land nor its owners will not
amount to a taking of property without due process of law.
[15] Id. -Annexation of Uninhabited Territory- Burdens and
Benefits.-~Where the burden which a complaining property
owner nntif'ipatPs from an amwxatiou of uninhnhit0d territory
to a city is thnt of a general ad valorem property tax imposed
to support the local govl~rnment, it is not necessary that any
sp<~cial benefit ac<>ruc to tl1e land by rPnson of the annexatiou.
[16] Taxation-Validity: Uniformity.-The validity of a city ad
valorPm tax does not depend on the receipt of some special
benefit as distinguished from the general benefit to the community; it is constitutionally sufficient if the tax is uniform
:md for public purposes in whieh the whole city has an interest.
[17] Municipal Corporations-Annexation of Uninhabited Territory-Taxation.-The performance of such ordinary municipal
services as police and fire protection within the existing boundaries of a city together with the prospect that the city,
consistent ~with its own interests and declared intent, will
extend those services to uninhahitf•d territory annexed to the
city, will justify the imposition of taxes and be sufficient to
satisfy the due process dauses of the state and federal Constitutions.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Hiver:;ide County. Hilton H. McCabe, Judge. Affirmed.
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in qno warranto to v~:st
of annrxation
lllliJJhabited
to a
. ,fudgment for defendant
after sustaining demurrer to ;nnended
leave to amend, affirmed.
];:dmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Eugene B. Sa<:obs
Delbert E. \Vong, Deputy Attorneys General, ,Joseph A.
and E. IN. Cunningham for Appellant.
,Jerome .I. Bunker, City Attorney, for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-'rhis is a proceeding in quo warranto to test
validity of the annexation of certain "uninhabited" territory to the city of Palm Springs. Plaintiff's complaint, which
the invalidity both generally and specifically, was
found insufficient by the trial court and judg·ment was entered in favor of defendant after a demurrer was sustained
without leave to amend.
[1] Quo warranto lies to attack a completed annexation
proceeding. (A.merican Distilling Co. v. Cdy Council, Sausa34 Cal.2d 660, 667 [213 P.2d 704, 18 A.L.R2d 1247].)
[2] Under existing law, the eomplaint is held sufficient if it
eharges the usurpation of the franchise in general terms.
(People v. City of Los Angeles, 133 Cal. 338, 340-341 [65 P.
74H].)
[3a] But if the pleader sets out the specific facts
relied on to show the usurpation, he assumes the burden of
allegation and proof, and the complaint is subject to general
demurrer if those facts do not state a causc of action. (Peov. City of Los Angeles, supra, 133 Cal. 338, 341.) [ 4] The
attorney-general has urged that we revise the existing rules
and require specific allegations in all cases where the aetion
brought on relation of private parties. \Ve have determined, however, that this request should more properly
be addressed to the I,egislature, and that the rules heretofore
established should govern these proeeedings.
[3b] And
since plaintiff does not contend that any additional grounds
are available to challenge this annexation, we have coneluded that the trial court did not err in denying leave to
and that plaintiff's cause must stand or fall on the
basis of the specific grounds alleged.
'l'be annexation was conducted pursuant to the "Annexat iou of Uninhabited Territory Act of 1939." (Stats. 1939,
eh. 2H7, p. 1567; now Gov. Code, §§ 35300-35326.) 'l'hat act
Jlermits a city to annex "contiguous uninhabited territory"
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n'.c;olution
0.) 'fhe
r<'asons for dcsir' describe the boundaries
annexed, designate it by an appropriate name, and contain notiee of the time and place
the legislative body will hear protrsts
the annexation. (Gov. Code, § 35306.) Copies of the resolution must
he published twice in both eity and eonnty newspapers of
general circulation, and written uoticc is to be mailed to
each landowner in the territory at least twl'Hty
before
the first public hearing. (Gov. Code, § :35311.)
A.ny owner of property within the territory may file writtr'n
protest at any time before the honr set for heaeing objeetions
(Gov. Code, § 35312), and the legislative body must hear and
pass upon all protests so made.
Code, § :3531:3.) If
the owners of one-half of the value of the territory protest,
further proceedings shall not be taken. (Gov. Code, § 3531:3.)
But if sufficient valid protests arc not made, thr legislative
body must approve or disapprove the annexation, by ordinance. (Gov. Code, § 35314.) '!'he annexation is eomplete when a eertified copy of the ordinance i8 transmitted
to the secretary of state and filed by him. (Gov. Code,
§ § 35316, 35:318.)
Plaintiff commenced this action after the annexation proceedings had been completed. 'l'he complaint alleged that
the annexation was void because ( 1) written notice of the
annexation proceedings was not given to one owner of land
within the territory; (2) the notiec and hearing given the
other landowners did not satisfy the statutory requirements;
(3) protests submitted to the city eouucil deprived it of
jurisdietion to annex the territory; and because ( 4) the
annexation is unreasonable; (5) amounts to a fraudulent
abuse of the statute; and ( 6) operates to talw property without
due process of law.
[5] First: PLaint,iff alleges that the Southern Pacific
Company, an owner of land in the territory, was not served
with written notice of its opportunity to protest tl1e annexation, and contends that this omission deprived the city council
of jurisdt:ction to annex the tm·ritory. As previously noted, the
statute requires that notice be given by publication and by
mail. (Gov. Code, § 35:311.) Plaintiff does not allege that
the city failed to mail written notice to all other landowners
in the annexed territory nor does plaintiff allege that the
(Gov.
i he

or
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as to publieation of notice were not
Under these eircumstances, the failure to allege
Southern Pacific Company did not acquire knowledge
contents of the published notice, that it did not apthc
that it desired to protest, or that it:s pronot in faet considered, renders this elairn
De Luca v. Boarcl of Supervisors,
609-GJl
P.2d 3U5].) If' it may
sai<l that the lang·uagc fonnd in In re Central Irrigation
117 Cal. :382 [49 P. 354,], carries any implication
10 the contral'y, 1re do not deem it applicable to the situation
Jn that ease the :;;tatute provided for but one form
wllid1 was notice by publication, and the published
was held to be fatally defcetive. Here there was merely
a failurE' to giH JJotiee to a single 1andowuer by one of two
methods. Ful'i hermore, it should be noted that the
deeision in the C<>ut raJ Trrigation District ease has been
limited iu its applieation to its preci:;;e facts. (See
Y. City of Montfbello, 192 Cal. 489, 493 (221 P. 207].)
Second: Plaintiff claims !hat 11o11e of the landowners
u·uc a[(ordecl the kind of notice or right of hearing required
by the act. This contention is based on the city's rt'fusal to
r·JJtertain either oral protests or written protests not tendered
uutil afi.er the hearing had commenced. Since the notice
of hearing speeificd that the council would hear and del ermine "all written protests filed with the City Council
to the hour'' set for hearing, no complaint can bE' made
c,f
adequaey if the city was justified in rejeeting all prote~ts not submitted in the form and at the time specified.
The statutory language is elear. Section 85312 of
tlH' Government Cod(; provides: "At any time before the
hom set for hE'aring ohjectionil, any owner of property within
the territory may file uTittcn protest .... " (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff seeks to giYe a permissive reading to this section,
on the word "ma)'." But the section mt'aus cxaetly
what it says~only 1uitten protests filed before the hour
se1 for hearing need be considered. The section is permissive
to the extent that no one is required to file a protest.
.A
other eonstrm·tion wonld re11der meaningless the limiting
words in the ucxt :mceeeding seetion, which requirE'S "the
body . . . [to] l1ear and pass upon all protests
so mark." (Em]Jhasif\ added; Gov. Code, § 35313.) 'rhe language in Path v. Cdu of Long Beach, 125 Cal.App.2d 520,
528 [270 P.2d 868 j, is not inconsistent with this position,
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since the issue in that ease was whether certain protests had
been prematurel.v signed.
Third: Plaintiff asserts that even without the oral and
tardy written
!her!' u·cre sufficient l'illi:d protests to
bar
proceedings. At the time of the hearing, the
applieable eotle sertion provided in part: "If protest is made
by Hw owner;.; of mw-half of the 1•alue of ll1e territory as shown
tlw last <'qualized assessml'nt roll, or if protest is mad;)
and private O\YIH'l'S Njrtal to one-half of the value
territory proposed to be annexed as determined by
the
body, fnrthN· pro(:CC(1ings shall not be taken."
(Bmphasis added; Cov. Code, § :)5in:3.) ln 19iJG, after this
annexation was ('Ompleted, the 1Jegis1ature amended this seetion by adding, ''As usrd in this artiele, 'value of the territory'
means the valne of the land and improvc>ments tlwreon.''
(Stats. 1~l55, eh. 19-±8, § 5, p. 3580.)
Plaintiff conteJH1s that the eity erred in its tletermination
that \Hittc11 proic'sts filed prior to the hearing represented
less than "one-half of the value of the territory." Plaintiff
eoneedes that the city's determination wac; eorrect if the
eity was entitled to consider the value of both land and improvements in determining the :mfficiency of protests. But
plaintiff eontends that before the 19G5 amendment, "value
of the territory" meant valnc of the land exelusive of improvements, and that this definition must govern these proceedings.
Plaintiff points to section 35305 of the Government Code
as an indication that land values only are to be considered.
That section provides: "Upon rereiving a written petition
requesting annexation . . . signed by the owners of not less
thau one-fourth of the land in the territory by area, and by
assessed value ... , the legislative body shall, without delay.
pass a resolution giving notiee of the proposed annexation."
The Si'ctlon does not support plaintiff's position.
[8] '· IJmHl'' meam.; ''the solid matrrial of the earth'' ( Civ.
Codr, § 659), and its Yalue does not include the value of
impro\·crnents the-reon.
(Sec Kronsc1· v. County of San
Rernnrdino, 29 Cal. 2d 766 [178 P.2d 441].) "Value of the
territory" has not been so interpreted. (See American Distilling Co. Y. C!ity Coll
Sausalito, snpra, 34 Ca1.2d 660,
GGG [2l:l P.2cl 704, 18 A.TJ.R 2d 1247].)
Both sed ion 3;')30:) a1Hl ~eetion 35313 \Vere fin;t enacted
as part of the "Annexation of Uninhabited rrerritory Act of
19il9" (Stats. 1!)39, c·h. 2D7, §§ :3, 6, p. 1G68) and were added
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:u llw (;o\.('J'IJJJIP!ll Codr• witJJ only lllinor
lll 1!14!!.
1:)tats. l!J4!J, (•h. 7U, pp. l2:i-12fi.) [9] Sill('<: t!JP L.•gislatnr.·
.
<'O!lsi.~li'nil.\· reqnir·er1 the petitions to lH• signr•<l hy owners
f 1101 Je~s tiJall Olle-fonnJJ of the "iand . . . by aSS('SSerl
yalne" (UoY. Coile. § ~l5:lOG), al](l llas at the smue tinh'
that atluexat ion Jli'Oi'<'l'ilillg-s l1e terminated if prois 1nade IJ)· own1·n; of one-lmlf of the ''y;dne or til<· li'l'l'iwry as s!JOwn by the last equalized a:;sessment roll" ({loy.
§ :33:n:3), it do('S not appear tlwt the two i<'si.s wer,·
rdc•nded to be equin1lents. \Ve therefore eonc-lnde that the
1!!53 amendmeut >Yas merely deelanttory of
law, and
that the eity rounc·il did not err in makin>~ itR t1f't(Tmination
on the basis of the valne of both land and improYr>meni.s.
[10] F'onrth: Plai!lt iff co11trmls til at the aunexai'ion 1·s
j•oid brrause it is um·er,smwblr. Plaintiff: admits that the annexation violates 110 express statutory limitation restrieting
1 he shape, extent or (:baraeter that annexed territory may
take. But the annexation is E;aid to be yoid bream;e it is
um·easonablr in scv(;rnl partieulars. In this n•gard it is
a1leged that the topography of the annexrtl lallil wakes it
mpossihlc of urhan c1eYelopment, that its size is out of all
proportion to the eity 's needs, that part oJ' tlw territory is
indudrd in a Hational forest, and that the lnnd will not
lH'lll'fit by inclusion ·within the eity.
A mere 1:itation of the many eases stating that the -.,-isilom or
o•x]wdietH·y of parti<'ular annexations is not a .iwlic·;nt question (People v. City of Rivr:n;idc, 70 Cal. 461, 4G:3 [D P. 6G2,
11 P. 73Dl; Johnson Y. City of San Pablo, 132 Cal.App.2d
,+-t7. 4.)7 [28:3 P.2d 57]; People v. Tmc:z of Corte Jlac!aa.
] ],) CaL\pp.2d :32, 47 [231 P.2d 988]; City of Dmlingamc
. County of San Mateo, 90 Cal.App.2d 70;), 7 J.l [203 P.2d
) ; that the eourls can go 110 further than to see tlrat the
existin;:; hny is obiic>rwd (People v. City of Rin:rside, supra;
y Y. City of C(n•ina, 1:1:3 Cal.App.2d 7.f,J, 73:3 [283 P.2d
rq I ; JollliSO!l \'. City of San Pablo. SU}JJ'a; People \'. Town
r'ortc i11ar7cra, supra; Potter v. City Councif, 102 Cal.App.
2d 141, 14:-i-14() [227 P.2d 25]; Cily of Burli11gamc v. County
of Ban 11falco, wpra); and that, subjed only to express statutory limita tious, the permissible shape, eharaeter or extent
of the territory annexed is a politieal question (People v.
City of Los Angeles, 154 Cal. 220, 224-225 [f!7 P. 311]; People
Y Tou•n of Corte Jladcra, supra. Ht pp. 4G-47; st>c also Ro.rJers
. Board of Directors of Pasadc1;a, 218 Cal. 221, 223 [22 P.2d
; People v. Toll'n of Loyalton, 147 CaL 774, 777-778 [82
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P.
), is snffi(oit>nt to show that
support in the law of this state.
Mon'OYer, the J,rgislature, not uumindful or tlle peeuliar
annexations attempted by some cities
Bnrlingame v. County of San Mateo, supra, 90 CaLApp.2d 705 fa
horseshoe shaped territory 100 feet wide,
fret lcmg, and
enclosing 730 acres of unincorporated
) , has made
no attempt to state a general rule governing the shape, eharacter or extent of territory that may be annexed; rather,
its efforts have been confined to curbing particular abuses of
the annexation acts.
e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 35002.5, 35326.)
By this treatment of the problem, the Lrgislature has manifested an intent that the courts should continue to treat these
questions as political in nature, and that an annexation should
not be declared invalid unless some express statutory provision has been violated. It follows that plaintiff's attempt
to establish this annexation as unreasonable does not state a
eause of action.
[11] Fifth: Pla:intijf claims that the annexation 1:s void as
a fmuclulent abuse of the cmthority conferTcd by stat~ttc.
It has been indicated that the courts have, and in appropriate
cases will exercise, the power to set aside a purported annexation where there has been a fraudulent abuse of the
statute. (City of Anaheim v. City of li'ullcrton, 102 Cal.App.
2c1 395 [227 P.2d 494]; People v. City of Jllon!crcy Park, 40
Cal.App. 715 f181 P. 825]. See also Rogers v. Bom'd of
Dir·cctors of Pasadena, supra, 218 Cal. 221, 223; People v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, 154 Cal. 220, 224; .Iohnson v.
City of San Pablo, supra, 132 Cal.App.2d 447, 456-457;
People v. Town of Corte lJiarlcra, supra, 115 CaLApp.2d
32, 44.)
But plaintiff's complaint does not present such a case.
The allegation of fraudulent abuse is based in large part on
the identical facts used as a predieate for the charge of unreasonableness. Since there was no violation or evasion of
any statutory provision relating to the detenni nation of the
laud to be annexed, plaintiff's allegations in that regard do
not establish a fraudnleut abuse of the statute. 'l'he assertion
that the city council assigned a false reason for annexing
the territory and the indefinite allegation that the real reason
was to subject the land to municipal taxes are conelusionary
and, in any event, add nothing to the complaint. [12] The
motives of the eity council cannot be inquired into so long
as it proceeded according to established law. (.I ohnson v.
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supra, 1:12 Cal.App.2d 447, 457; People v.
supra, 115 Cal.App.2d 32, 47; City of
San
supra, 90 Cal.App.2d
cmdcnds that the aunc:x:ation will
u;ithout due process
law. There
no merit in t11is contention. No one has a vested right
o lH~ either ineluded or exe1uded from a local governmental
Y. Hoard
145 Cal.App.2d 8, 11
) , and the fixing of territorial boundaries of
c·.orporation will not ordinarily constitute an
federal constitutional rights. (Hunter v. City
207 U. S. 161, 178-179 [28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed.
01]; Forsyth Y. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 518 [17 S.Ct.
41 L.Ed. 1095]; Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 104 U. S.
80-81 [26 L.Ed. 6fl8].)
Bnt plaintiff contcmds that neither the land nor its owners
will he benefited "by inc.Jusion within . . . the city" nor
will the land or landowners receive ''any of the b<~nefits
eustomarily resulting to property and property owners" within a munieipality; and that the burden of municipal taxes,
whid1 is certain to follow the annexation, will amount to a
of property without due process of law. Plaintiff
relies on JJiylcs Salt Co. v. Iberia Draina.r;e Dist., 239 U.S.
478 [36 S.Ct. 204, 60 L.Ed. 392]. In that ('ase the plaintiff
(•ha1Jenged the validity of a tax imposed by a special taxing
district to finance the construction and maintenance of a
drainage system. It was held that plaintiff's land could not
be taxed sinee it would not be benefited by the proposed
improvements.
[14] That case is readily distinguishable and the rule
emmciated is not applieable here. (Morton Salt Co. v. City
South Hutchinson, 177 F.2d 889, 891-892; State ex rel. Pan
AmeTican Production Co. v. Texas City, - - Tex. · - - [303
R.\Y.2<l 7RO, 783], appeal dismissed per curiam, 3f)5 F.S. 608
S.Ct. G33, 2 l.J.E(l.2d 523].) Special taxing districts can
('Onfer but one readily astertaiuable benefit peculiarly advanto the property Yrithin the district and if it does not
}l!'<~nw to padi('ular land, an assessment of that ]and to
fiJJ:mvc the impron"ments amonnts to a taking of property
wi1l1oHt due Jll'OC'rm; of law. But the rule is otherwise with
rrsped to muui('ipal eorporations >vho,;e advantages are geul'l'al and Yaried, iu('luc1ing "the legally presumed intangible
he1wfits rrsnlting from the priYilege of being part of an organ-
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izcd
Salt Co. v. City of South Htdchinson, supra, 177 F.2d at p.
[15] Since the burden which plaintiff anticipates is that of
a
ad valorem property tax imposed to support the
loeal government, it is not necessary that any special benefit
aeerue to the land by reason of the annexation. (GUy of Santa
Rosa v. Coulta, 58 CaL 537; see also Town
Di:wn v. Mayes,
72 Cal.1G6, 168
P. 471].) [16] The validity of sueh a tax
doc's not depend on the receipt of some special benefit as distinguished from the general benefit to the community. (M emis & Charleston Ry. Co. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241, 246, 249 [51
S.Ct. 108, 75 L.Ed. 315, 72 A.hR. 1096] ; St. Lm1/is & S. W.
Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U.S. 157, 159 [48 S.Ct. 438, 72 hEd.
830] ; JJlorton Salt Co. v. City of Sonth Hutchinso11, supra,
177 .F'.2d 889, 8n-892.) "[I] t is constitntionally sufficient if
the taxes are uniform and are for public pnrposes in which
the whole city has an interest." (ll1odon Salt Co. v. City of
South Ilntchinson, supra, 177 P.2d 889, 891.) [17] 'rhus
the performance of such ordinary municipal services as police
and fire protection within the existing boundaries of the city
(sec Kelly v. City of Pittsbtagh, supra, 104 U.S. 78, 82) together with the prospect that the city, consistent with its own
interests and declared intent, will extend those services to
the annexed territory, will justify the imposition of taxrs and
will be sufficient to satisfy the due process clauses of the
state (Anaheim S1tr;ar Co. v. Cmtnty of Oranr;e, 181 Cal. 212,
217 [188 P. 809] ; City of Santa Rosa v. Conlter, 58 Cal. 537)
and federal constitutions. (Kelly v. City of Pittsbnrgh, snpra,
104 lT.S. 78, 82; Anaheim S11gar Co. v. County of Ornnge,
snpra; see also Bailey v. Collector of Manasqnan, 53 N.J.L.
162, Hi3-166 [20 A. 772].)
Since plaintiff's specific allegations do not establish the
invalidity of the annexation, it is unnecessary to consider the
effect of the '' I<'irst Validating Act of 1955'' ( Stats. 1955, ch.
11, p. 454) which purported to validate "all aets and proceedings heretofore taken by any public body under any law, or
under color of any law, for the annexation or inclusion of
territory into any sueh public body.
" (Stats. 1955, eh.
11, § 4, p. 456.)
'l'he judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C .•T., Shenk, J., 'I'raynor, J., and MeComb, J., concurred.
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disseut
annexation violates
cd eour·epts of
of Jaw. The piYotal inequity is this: '!'he Pohn
Couneil ha,; used power dcleg;att•d to it by
ure to rnguegc~ territory to wllieh it is not po\Yhirh will not benefit from iDrJusion
and whit~h will tlwreaJ'ie.r be subjeeJ to taxation
the (·it;v·. 'l'!J(~ e1eetoes of Palm
Thet·pfore it i:s
only to thrir
,·ontroi and ueed lw loyal onl,v to 1hrie interests to remain
Tlw ownet·s oE proximate nninhabitPd lands may
exl'rt llO eontrol OV('r the eomwil before or after anJJcxation.
Tllt•
will bendit from
expansion of poliee t:ontrol
" 'rlw Jamlo>vllers will be snhjeeted to taxrs
nnd
ordinam•es. The majority of this eourt holds no
benPfit need <t<,erne to the landowners from tllis amwxation
and the t:omplaint alleges no11e will. The eonflid in interest
overt.
,Justifieaiion of 1his annexation violates the axiom of AngloAmerican juri:-;prudenec that one may not be the judge of
own cause (Coke Upon Littleton, § 212; Bonhrrm 's Cnsc
! 1()]0], 77 Eng. Hcp. 646; Dam v. Sauadgc [1610], 80 Eng.
2:35; Cooley, Constit ntiollal Limitations ( 2d ed.), 508;
sre 11. ] ) aJJd is analogous to "taxation without representa1ion.'11 Ordinantes delegating powet· oYer an individual's
to 1wighboring property owners are unconstitu: ional heeanse the po\n'r mny b" ilrhitrarily used and be;·fmse of JlOssiblt• (·.ollflieting- intcn~sts. (8('(1/tlr; Title Trn ..d
r'o. v. Ro/Jauc, 278 U.S. J1G [4D S.Ct. 50, 7:3 L.I<Jd. 210];
Fubanl.: ''· Citu
Rich
226 U.S ..B7 [:l~1 S.Ct. 76, .)7
L.Ed. FiG, 42 L.lLA.N.S. l12:lJ.) Similar California :-:tatut0s
nn· saYed beeau.~e the eonrts will interpret hm·s to eonfonn to
(·omditutional safegnarch againsi arbitrarinrss and eompel
;Hilllillistratiye offi<·,•rs to ad aer·ordin;rl.\· ( .Yrtr l'ork r·x: rel.
l.ichermau \'. Vnn de Carr, HW F. S. 5:)2 126 S. Ct. 144, 50
d~d. 3();)]; J:ultrnrorth v. Bo!td, 12 Cal.2d 140, 14!) [82
.2d ·±:lJ. 12() .A.ldL S:lSl; l'r:oplc \'.Globe Orain ,(· Jlilf. Co ...
_11 Cnl. 121, J:2S
P. :lJ; fiayiord v. City of Pasadcua,
lrn . e sole means ol' preventing nn ntnll:xation js. not]('c to t.1w int('n~sh'(l
l:lndowJJC•fs au(i tJ1cir wrjttcn rrot.c,:.<t. The protcdjolls of an clec·1jon are
they aru pl o1·ided where iJJ]JaiJitcd tcnitory is
(Cm·. Coile, H :;~JOII3.')J:JH.) Jn tl!c instant ca:w
rnvncrs de:-;iriJlg' to proh,si were a0uled that -riglJt by an ::unlliguous
Aatute intcrvretcrl incorrectly ngain8t tltem.

GO

[ 31 C.:2d

175 Cal. 433, 437 [166 P. 348] ). A city council may not
exercise its discretion arbitrarily (Roussey v. City of Burlinoame, 100 Cal.App.2d 321 [223 P.2d 517]) and eourt>; review facts entering into a council's decision and overrule it
if it is arbitrary. (Bleucl v. City of Oakland, 87 Cal.App.
594 [262 P. 477] .) Because the Legislature's power to annex
land to municipalities-ergo to tax and police-is delegated
to a body with interests conflicting with those over whom the
power may be used, the exercising body has a position of trust
analogous to a fiduciary. The law demands the careful and
fair use of such power. Yet this court again declares that
only fraud suffices to nullify annexation proceedings. (See
People v. City of Los Angeles, 154 Cal. 220, 224 [97 P. 311] ;
People v. Town of Loyalton, 147 Cal. 774, 778 [82 P. 620] .)
The annexation also runs afoul of another constitutional
rule: \Vhere a state Legislature delegates power to form and
define a special district, a hearing is required on the issue
of whPther or not particular land is benefited by inclusion.
(Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 306
U. S. 459, 464 [59 S. Ct. 622, 83 r_..Ed. 921] ; Brownino v.
Hooper, 269 U. S. 396 [46 S. Ct. 141, 70 L.Ed. 330]; Fallbrook lrr. Dist. v. Bmdley, 164 U. S. 112, 167 [17 S. Ct. 56,
41 I .. Ed. 369]; Miller & Lux v. Board of Supe1·visors, 189
Cal. 254 [ 208 P. 304].) I,and not benefited may not be
included. (Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, supra, 172, 173.)
It logically follows that a finding of benefit unsupported in
fact is null, since the hearing would otherwise be a sham.
'l'his court holds the decision of the municipal body is not
subject to judicial review. This holding is indefensible. In
,lfylcs Salt Co. v. Iberia etc. Drainage Dist., 239 U. S. 478
[36 S. Ct. 204, 60 L.Ed. 392], the court reversed the sustaining of a demurrer to a suit to restrain tax sale of land.
Petitioner's land had been included in a drainage district
organized pursuant to Louisiana statutes by the police juries
of the parishes concerned. Petitioner alleged his land did not
benefit from operation of the district although he had to pay
taxes to it. The trial court and the r_.ouisiana Supreme Court
held the inclusion was a legitimate exercise of discretionary
legislative powers and the courts were not permitted to intervene in the absence of fraud-in effect, that it was a "political
question.'' '!'he Supreme Court held this was an act of
confiscation and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. At
page 481 the court said the delegation of power to include
the land in the district was valid but its use which is" palpably
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and a plain abusn" is ill1~gal. 'i'hm·eforn US\' of thi~
is not a po1itieal question and a state may not permit
arbitntr.v exereisl'. Although tlJC instant ease has not

pOll'(~!'

rNwhed the point of a tax sa.Je, the prinripJe is applieab}e:
'l'he iuelusion within an iueorporated area of lands not thnreby
benefited is uneonstitntional. I ean see no difference between
including land arbitrarily iu a special distriet and in a mnni<ripality.
'The .instant ease is stronger than the Myles Salt case because the political body enlarging itself is not politically
responsible to the territory engorged. 'fhe drainage district
in 1Iyles Salt was organized by the police juries of the
parishes in which the land in issue was situated.
It is important to observe that this case is before ns on
demurrer since the allegations of the complaint must be assumed true. 'I' he complaint alleges facts which bri ug it w·ithin
the scope of the Myles Salt rule. It states that the area proposed to be annexed "extends up and along the uortlwm and
northea~;tern slopes of Mount San ,J aeiuto peak all(l varies iu
elevation from approximately 700 feet to 4,000 feet. \Vith
the exception of a few portions totaling an area of approximately one and a half square miles, the territory . . . eonsists
entirely of precipitous gorges and gullies, high roeky ridges
and steep rocky slopes, narrow canyons and sandy washes
subjeet to flash Hoods. \Vith the exception of approximately
two miles of highway No. 111 . . . a short road of approximately two miles iu lcmgth in Chino Canyon and one in Snow
Creek Canyou, approximately one and a half miles long, there
are no pnblie roads or other means of aceess into the area.
Up to approximately 80 per cent of the total area is inaceessible on foot without special mountain climbing equipment
or without taking an extremely circuitous route . . . .
"That it is not true that there are indicationf:l that in the
near future or any other time said territory sought to be
annexed will be improved with buildings and other strnetnres
suitable for residential development or for commercial development to serve the alleged tramway development or any
other development or purpose. . . . That an extPnsion of flre
and pollee or flre or police protection by defendant city to
the territory proposed to be annexed is and will contiHue to
be for a1l practieal purposes impossible beeause of its great
area and the character of the terrain, as herein above allegpcl
aud said territory will not benefit by any attempted extension
of snch protection by defendant. That at none of the times
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or in the
Jwr-ein
foresceabh; future any
,;aid pro·
tramway ref<ol'I'<'d to in said onlinanee \YOtdd he 01' will
be (•onstrueted. En•n if eom;tnwted, an.v st rudnre or sLruc·
turcs used in (~Onllcction therewith would oceupy only an
small portion of Chino Canyon and \YOuld not be
nrbau in eharadcr and 'rould in 110 malllJel' affeet or alter
the remainiug portions of tlw
to he anHexed . . . .
"That defendant will not and caunot either now m· in the
foreseeable future extend to the property withiu the territory
proposed to be annexed, except that adjaccut to existing roads,
any of the municipal services or advantages customarily supplies [siel to property within the municipal boundries [sie]
of ineorporated towns aud cities, nor will at any such times
the property or the property owners within the territory . . .
be in any manner benefited Ly inclusion within the boundries
[sie] of defendant city. '!'hat defendant nevertheless proposes to subject all taxable property within said territory to
taxation for 1mmieipal purposes. That the proposed annexation of said territory is unreasonable and unwarranted. in that
and for the reasons that said territory is unsuitable for and
impossible of urban development and uses and is not authorized by the Jaws of the State of California relating to the
annexation of unillhabited territory. 'l'hat the proposed and
attempted annexation of said territory by defendant under
the provisions of sueh laws because of the fads herein alleged,
operates as au attewp1ed fraudulent use of slwh laws in view
of the dwraet('r of the terrain and extent of the area indnded
within said vroposed annexation . . . .
'''I' hat said proposed annexation is void for the rem:on that
it would subjed the property and property OWJWI'S 1vithin the
territory proposed to be annexed to taxatiolJ for munie i pal
pn1·pos(·,; without giYing to snell JlrOJl<>rty all(1 owners any
of the bPnPfits <·ustomarily n':mliing to Jll'Opcrty and property
omwrs within the boull(1ries [sie] of a munie.ipal <~orporation
anll 1nmld tlwreforc operate to take propt~rty of suc·h owners
1ritlwut due process of law and without compelL~alin;L .. "
'l'his complai11t alleges every fact held neeec;sary for iujnndiw relit'f in Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia clc. Dminagc Dist.,
supra, at 484. Condusions of fraud, 110 benefit to the land
annexed (see the Myles Salt ease, supra, at 484-485), and no
sufficient reason for annexation are sustained by fads also
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could not be more concretely formed
,without pleading evidentiary facts.
These facts must be emphasized as they brillg the instant
within the JYiyles Salt rnle rather than that of St. Louis
d':
W. Ry. Co. v.
277 U.S. 157
S.Ct. 438, 72
L.Ed.
, eited by the majority. In the Nattiu case, a
and a line of tra(•k owned hy plaintiff railroad lay
within a roall distriet ereaied by the parish
jury. 'l'he
was
to the terl'itory l11eluded
'Within the road distrid. The railroad eomplaiued that it
would derive no benefit ft"om inelusion in the road distriet,
and that eollstrurtion of rertain proposed roads would be
deleterious to it. However, there was no suggestion that the police jury gerrymandered the road district
to include the railroad's property for taxation. It appears
to have been included fortuitously. The same may be said of
the area in issue in State ex rel. Pan American Production Co.
v. Texas City, - - Tex. - - [303 S.W.2d 780], appeal dismissed 355 U.S. 603 [78 S.Ct. 533, 2 hEd.2d 523]. In fact,
the railroad complains of a road which will parallel one of its
lines, implying that that particular track was included simply
because a road was to be built there. This factual context
vindicates the rule that an ad valorem tax need not confer
special benefits upon those paying it. To prorate taxes for
road construction among taxpayers according to the benefits
each derives is obviously impossible. 2
These facts contrast with those in Myles Salt which also
involved an ad valorem tax. The Myles Salt Company owned
an island of 175 feet elevation surrounded by bayous. Across
the bayous lay lowlands of 15 feet elevation. Drainage distriets were needed in this part of Louisiana to remove waters
from the lowlands into the bayous. However, the elevation of
the company's island made erosion, not drainage, a serious
peoblem. Inclusion of the island in the drainage district (:ould
not be defended on any prac.tical ground. It was gerrymandered to provide a tax source. i\ not her classic example
is found in Hines v. Clarendon Levee Dist., 264 F. 127.
In the instant case the eomplaint alleges the same type of
gerrymandering as in the Myles Salt case. 'rhe need for fin•,
poliee ancl other JI\Ulli('ipal sen·i<:es in the iPITitory proposc·d
for annexation is about as beneficial as drainage in the ]\lyles
2
These fnets are stnted in 81. Louis 9· 8. W. Ry. Co. v. Nattin, 27 F.2d
766, which wns the same case in a three-judge district court.
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Island. That being included in a municipality is of itself a
blessing is a gross fiction. School, police and other necessary
public facilities are provided by the county in a manner better
suited to solve the problems of rural society. To apply urban
rules and techniques to rural problems is inane at best. 'l'he
local political organization of such areas is provided by
county governments.
The cases cited by the majority against petitioner's due
process contention do not face the instant problem. Complainant's land in Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78
[26 L.Ed. 658], was placed within Pittsburgh by the state
Legislature. (See Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 170
[27 Am.Rep. 633].) This act was not challenged.
The same defect renders inapposite City of Santa Rosa v.
Coultet·, 58 Cal. 537, 3 Town of Dixon v. JJiayes, 72 Cal. 166
[13 P. 471] ; and Memphis & Charleston Ry. Co. v. Pace, 282
U.S. 241 [51 S.Ct. 108, 75 L.Ed. 315, 72 A.L.R. 1096].
lltm·ton Salt Co. v. City of South Htttchinson, 177 F.2d 889,
involved taxation of land which was already within the city
when plaintiff's factory was built. There was no issue of
annexation in the case.
Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 [17 S.Ct. 665, 41 L.Ed.
1095], held (1) the federal courts had no power over the
case because the same cause was pending in the state courts;
and (2) the lower federal court had improperly undertaken
to interpret state law to determine the case. Language at page
518 implies that constitutional rights may be infringed by a
state's creation or alteration of municipal boundaries.
The plaintiff in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161
[28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151], merely attacked the state statute
delegating power to the electorate of one city to in effect
ingest another. The court rejected this. The importance of
this distinction is clear upon comparing this case with the
Myles Salt case at pages 484-485. The arbitrary use of the
power was not attacked. Also (1) there were no facts showing
the new municipality would not be of some benefit to complainants; (2) the facts indicated merely that plaintiffs
would not benefit proportt'onately, but did not show they
would not benefit at all; (3) the electors of the two communities voted for the unification. The issue of the validity of a
state statute was before the United States Supreme Court in
State ex rel. Pan American Production Co. v. Texas City, 355
•see Stats. 1875-76, ch. 108, p. 251, at 252.
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S.Ct. 5:3:3,2 Id~d.2d 52:3]. 'l'he fita1c appca7crl the
decision of the 'i'cxas Supreme Court under U.S.C.A. title 28,
seetion 1257(2). 'rhis raised the issue of the validity of the
statute pnrsuant to which Texas City expanded itself. This
pht(·ed the ease under the aegis of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, supra/ since the validity of the statute was also there
attacked. State acts pursuant to a valid statute may only be
attacked by errtiorari pursuant to U.S.C.A. title 28, section
1257, subdivision ( :3). 5 This distinction is noted in Myles
Salt whieh states that such statutes themselves are valid although state action pursuant to them may be unconstitutional.
'l'he 'l'rxas City case is also different from the instant one in
that it went to trial and judgment was entered against petitioners. (See State ex rel. Pan American Production Co. v.
'l'c.x:as City ('rex.Civ.App.), 295 S.W.2d 697, at 699.)
The question in Anaheim Sugar Co. v. County of Orange,
181 Cal. 212 [18:3 P. 809], coneerned the proportion of benefits received, not the absence of benefits. The proeeedings for
the organization of a road district were held invalid in that
ease.
Bailey v. Collector of Manasquan, 5:3 N .•J.r_,. 162 [20 A.
772], was decided in 1890, before the United States Supreme
Court eases upon which this dissent rests, were decided. Although there may be no vested right to be excluded from a
governmental unit (Peart v. Board of Supervisors, 145 Cal.
App.2d 8, 11 [:301 P.2d 874]) there is a right to due process
in annexation proceedings.
The doctriue that the permissible shape, character or extent
•Although U.S.C.A. title 28, section 2103, provides that an appeal
improvidently taken may be considered as a petition for certiorari, it
must not be assumed that the attorneys for tho State of Texas followed
an incorrect procedural path of attack. 'l'herefore it appears the statute
itself was questioned.
5
U.S.C.A. title 28, section 1257, provides in part:
'' J<'inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by tho Supreme Court
as follows: . . .
"(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statuto
of any state on tlJC ground of its being repugnant to the Constitt1tion,
treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its
validity.
"(3) By writ of certiorari, whore the validity of a treaty or statute
of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a
State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant
to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where
any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or
authority exercised under, the United States.''
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po]ilit•;il lj\if'StioJJ Hl'O~!' Ill i'llSI'S
invn1Ying· iJJi·orporH1ioJI
Y.
11d illllll'X111 ion ol' i11llahited al'l'lh_
rf-cl"rs u( l'usadr illl, :.::18 C:ll. 2:21
1'.:2d ;-JO:l l: l'cojile Y.
A
supra.) !Jl<·orporation i'l'(jllin•s an deetion iu whii·h a
of the elc1•1ors in the area lo be
mu:'t vote for
Por annexation of
mhabited territor,\·, a majority of eledors of tlw munieipalit.'·
aud a majority of those in the tenitory to be amwx1'd must
vote for annexation. 'l'o vitiate this, a court would have to
eontravene the ·w.ill of an electorate. In eharaetl'rizing the
question "politieal," the court in People v. City of Los Ansupra, dwelt at length upon the role of the voters. 'rhe
doetrine \HIS improperly extended to annexations of uninhabited land, concerning >Yhieh no eledion is held, in City of
Burlinyanw v. Connty of San Mateo, 90 CaLApp.2d 705 [20:3
P.2d 807]. At pages 709-710 tllc ('OUl't quoted I'cople v. City
of Los Angeles, supra, for this proposition. This court has
interpreted artide XI, section 6, of the California Constitution to require thi• Ijegislature to enaet only general laws
relating to mtmieipal annexations. (People v. Town of Ontario, 148 Cal. 625, see p. 629 [84 P. 2():')].) 'rhe Legislature
is naturally ineapable of defining boundaries of particular
cities by general laws.
(Observed iu People v. 'Town of
(hi/ ario, supra, at 629.) 'rherefore it euacted statutory schemes
dPlegating to the legislative bodies of the municipalities the
power to annex uninhabited lands. (Gov. Code, §§ :35000:35006; :-:15200-35213: 3:5300-3::5~125.) 'l'his court herdJy makes
this povver plenary aud subjeet to abmw and arbitrary exPreist?
without remedy to those \vrouged. The majority of states
limit arm:oxatioJJS to "reasonable" ones. (2 1\T(:Qnillin, Munieipal Corporations, 3d eel., p. 322.) California must concur
or permit eontinued incursions on the right to privati? property of her citizens.
In summary:
( 1) A municipal legislative body aets as an administrative
body exereising powers delegated by the state I~egislature
''"hen it llll!H'xes territory;
(2) It has a relationship of trust to owners of land propose\1 for annexation;
(:3) 'rhese landowners are entitled to a hearing ou the issue
of b('nefit to their land by annexation and to a finding of
bem•fit based upon facts;
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A eourt should overthrow the annexation if the finding
benefit is
or lacking in fadual support;
( 5) If these elements are not satisfied, the annexation is
n neonsti tutiona 1.
The majority has also interpreted an ambiguous statute
those
Govenmwnt Code, seetion il5312,
''At a11y time brfore
ohjeetions,
n.v owner of prope1·ty within the i
may file written
the annexation. Tlw protest shall state the
name of the owner of the properly affeeted and tlw description
and area of the property in general terms.''
Seetion il5313 provides:
''At tbe time set for hearing protests the legislative body
;.;hall hear and pass npon all protests so made. ff protest is
made by tlH• owners of one-half of the value of the territory
as shmn1 by the lm;t equalized assrssmrnt roll, or if protest is
made
publie and private owners equal to one-half of the
value of the territory proposed to be annexed as determined
the legislatiye body, further proceedings shall not be
taken."
The majority holds that "protests so made" refe1·s to protests mad<' pursuant to seetion 35312. This con:;truction is unJWees~ar.v an<l inconsonant with the aim of the sections.
Sed ion :\:Jill2 aims to provide a method of protest for landowners n:1ahk to attend a hearing. Note, that sedion says:
"At any time be for<' the honr set for !waring objections .... "
'J'lJis dearly eontemplates a "hearing'' of objections in add.i,
1ion io those wriiten. Se•·tion 3G313 says: "At the time set
foe hrm·ing proiests .... '' If a protest is written it need not
again be heard. This ekal'ly providrs for a different kind of
protest. Ji'urther. if sedion 8!i313 is interpreted to mean a
hearing iR to hr hrld on all written protests, it would require
;ill property o\\·m•rs filing written p1·otrsts pursuant to seetion
:J.):312 to appear at the "hearing." Sin(•e man.v- ow1wrs oi
unin habitrd ]all(h mn:: reside miles away from their property,
iht>y eonld not. pen;onally appear and present their protests.
"Protests so nwde" thi·refore refers to protests which are
"!ware!." ?\o rc·asoH of eouvenit>nce appear;; why protests
should 110t also he pres('nted at the "time• set for hearing
protests.''
'l'lle First \'alidaiing Ad of J95i) (Stats. 19,)5, ch. 11, p.
~l:i+; effeeiiw ,January 2R, ]9;)5) pnrporti'il to validate" fa]ll
ac:ts and pnwecdings hen•tofore taken by any public body
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under any law, or under color of any law, for the annexation
or inclusion of territory into any such public body. . . . "
( § 4.) Section 6 (d) provides: "This act shall not operate to
confirm, validate, or legalize any act, proceeding, or other
matter the legality of which is being contested or inquired into
in any legal proceeding now pending and undetermined or
which may be pending and undetermined during the period of
30 days from and after the effer:tive date of this act. . . "
(Emphasis added.)
Paragraph five of the amended complaint alleges that on
November 5, 1954, the relators filed a complaint in quo warranto in the Superior Court of Riverside County challenging
the proceedings to annex the territory here in question. Defendant's demurrer to this complaint acknowlrdges that this
action was still pending on March 23, 1956. Since this action
challenged the legality of the annexation proceedings and was
pending at the time the First Validating Act became effective,
the act does not cure any defects which may taint the pro"eedings.
A validating act is impotent to cure the jurisdictional defeets alleged in the complaint: (1) The arbitrary finding that
the territory in question would benefit by annexation; or (2)
refusal to hear protests of landowners which were not made
in writing before the time set for protests to be heard. (Miller
& Lux v. Boa1·d of Supervisors, supra.)
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the view of the law
as developed in Mr. Justice Carter's dissenting opinion and
join in the conclusion that the judgment should be reversed.

